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REPLY STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Nelsons reaffirm the "Statement of the Case" made in their opening
appellate brief. The Nelsons' factual statements are based on the Magistrate
Court's findings of fact and are supported by the appellate record. By contrast,
the Evanses' statement of the case lacks foundation and is only supported by
their allegations; it does not have any documentation in the appellate record.
In essence, the Evanses are trying to contradict the Magistrate Court's
findings with a brand-new factual narrative. For instance, the Evanses allege that
they "experienced numerous attempts by the Nelsons to insert themselves inappropriately into their lives and the lives of their young children," and that they always had "lingering concerns about their children interacting with their grandparents" (Respondents' Brief, p. 4). The Evanses further allege that the Nelsons had
engaged in "overbearing behavior [which] could have negative lasting effects on
a young person's psyche." (ld.). 1 These statements by the Evanses are contrary
to the Magistrate Court's findings and are only supported by deposition statements. (See below). The Magistrate was required to construe all facts and inferences in the Nelsons' favor. Jones v. Jones, 100 Idaho 510, 601 P.2d 1 (1979).
The Magistrate attempted to do so in its decision. (R. pp. 71-3). On appeal, the
Evanses are not allowed to present a narrative that is contrary to the Nelsons'
evidence and the Magistrate's findings. The Supreme Court should reject the
Evanses' narrative as being at-odds with the following findings by the Magistrate:
1 A more egregious
example of the Evanses' attempt to introduce a new appellate narrative is
their label of Mr. Nelson as a mere "stepfather." (Respondents' Brief, p. 4). Mr. Nelson legally
adopted Stephanie as his daughter, while she was an adult, on November 25, 2002.
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•

The Evanses and the Nelsons maintained a close family relationship in
California from 2006-2015 (R. p. 71 );

•

Upon the birth of each grandchild, the Nelsons started an immediate and
close bond with each child (R. pp. 71-2);

•

The Nelsons were actively involved in the day-to-day lives of the grandchildren (R. p. 72);

•

The Evanses announced they were moving to Idaho, and the Nelsons objected to the form of the Evanses' sale and to the prospect of losing their
(the Nelsons') half of the home value in the sale (R. p. 72);

•

Negotiations over the form of the sale became contentious (R. p. 72);

•

Stephanie told Linda Nelson that if they forced the issue, they would never
see their grandchildren again (R. p. 72);

•

The Nelsons attempted to reconcile with the Evanses but to no avail. The
Evanses cut off all contact with the Nelsons. (R. p. 73); and,

•

The Evanses' decision to cut off all grandparent visitation and communication was retaliatory and was made to inflict harm on the Nelsons without
regard to the consequences on the children. (R. p. 73).
To repeat-the Supreme Court should not allow the Evanses to go out-

side these findings on appeal. The Evanses did not file a Rule 52(b) motion to
alter or amend the Magistrate's findings. As a result, the Evanses must argue
within the confines of the findings on appeal. The Evanses are not allowed to rely on select portions of Stephanie's deposition to create a counter-narrative on
appeal.
In sum, the Evanses are trying to change the Magistrate's findings on appeal. The Nelsons wish to reply to the Evanses' new narrative on appeal, to help
clarify the appropriate factual basis for the appeal. The Nelsons feel this is war-
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ranted under I.AR. 35(c) as "rebuttal to the contentions of the respondent." The
Nelsons have fully supported their narrative in the record on appeal.
The Close Family Relationship

During the early years of the grandchildren's lives, the Nelsons and the
Evanses enjoyed a very close and loving relationship. (R. p. 71 ). Stephanie Evans and Linda Nelson, in particular, enjoyed a close and loving relationship without any pressure by Linda upon Stephanie to behave in any particular way, other
than for Stephanie to be her natural, sweet self. Nor was there any stress placed
on the Evanses or their children in the form of any alleged invasions of boundaries; the Nelsons worked hard to ensure that all contact between the parties was
at the Evanses' convenience and wishes. The Nelsons thoroughly documented
these relationship facts with the Magistrate Court, as follows:
•

Exhibit No. 1: Text Library -October 14, 2012 thru February 18, 2017.
(Aug. R. pp. 207-435);

•

Exhibit No. 2: Pictorial History - March 9, 2006 thru May 8, 2015. (Aug. R.
pp. 436-542);

•

Exhibit No. 3: Chronology of Events - April 10, 2015 thru June 12, 2019.
(Aug. R. pp. 581-700);

•

Exhibit No. 4: Future Educational Checks - 2010 through 2013. (Aug. R.
pp. 543-51 ).

(See also references to appellate record in the "Statement of the Case," Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 7-11 ). The Evanses provided no responsive evidence,
either during discovery or on appeal, to support their counter-narrative. For instance, the Evanses give no documentary evidence that the Nelsons tried to
innapropriately insert themselves into the Evanses' lives or invite themselves to
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the Evanses' family events. The record shows that the contacts and meetings
between the Nelsons and the Evanses were always with the Evanses' permission and approval, and only at their (the Evanses') convenience. As a result, the
parties were very close to each other for nearly a decade, without any need for
the Evanses to acquiesce or bend to the Nelsons' wishes. (Id.).
The Evanses never expressed any concerns to the Nelsons about their
children's interactions with the Nelsons. Just the opposite-th e Evanses showed
complete and enthusiastic support for the interactions between the Nelsons and
their grandchildren. Stephanie never complained to the Nelsons, in the thousands of text messages between herself and Linda Nelson, that she (Stephanie)
was concerned about the Nelsons' impact as grandparents on the wellbeing of
the children. In fact, Stephanie's texts reveal the peace of mind she always had
when the children were in the Nelsons' care. Stephanie never mentioned that
the relationship between the Nelsons and the children could have had a permanent (or even temporary) negative impact on the children's psyches.
Stephanie permitted the children to have dozens of overnight stays at the
Nelsons' home, and she (Stephanie) permitted the children to have hundreds of
playdates between only the children and the Nelsons. Stephanie welcomed
these opportunities. For examples, see text messages on "Play Dates," Aug. R.
p. 316-46; see also Aug. R. p. 299, where Stephanie says in a text-message to
Linda Nelson: "I want to say thank u so much from the bottom of my heart for
taking such good care of the girls today. So much peace knowing they were in
superb hands today. Seriously, I didn't worry about ya'II for one second. That
ain't easy for me .. .lu." See also Aug. R. p. 265, where Stephanie makes the fol-
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lowing statement to Linda about the grandchildren's overnight visits: "They had
an absolute blast. .. A.R.E. says she is ready to go back, and this time I believe
her... thanks again for a great time!"
The Evanses never expressed any concerns to the Nelsons about the
children acting differently as a result of the Nelsons' purchase of gifts for the
children. That is because Linda always asked Stephanie for her suggestions as
to gifts, to ensure Stephanie's approval and the grandchildren's happiness. For
example, Stephanie and Linda engaged in the following text message exchange:
Linda: "And I'd really like ur/her input so ur both happy with the end result;"
Stephanie: "She's (CAE) pretty adamant about wanting the more expensive lego
set. .. I'll make a list;" Linda: "Well, It doesn't really matter 2 me ... I just want u
both 2 be happy xo." (Aug. R. pp. 217-18). For additional texts involving the Evanses consent to the Nelsons' birthday and Christmas gifts, see Aug. R. pp. 215-

46.
The Evanses argue that the Nelsons' documentary evidence "speaks
more to the tenacity of the Nelsons and their attorneys than to the best interests
of the children." (Respondent's Brief, p. 33). But that is a conclusory statement
and is not supported by any citations to the record. The appellate record shows
the opposite, i.e., that the texts and emails and other interactions between the
Evanses and the Nelsons were two-way interactions. The record does not contain any evidence of interference or tenacity by the Nelsons. The Supreme Court
can review the evidence and find that it matches the Magistrate's findings of a
"close family relationship" before the parties' financial dispute. (R. p. 71 ).
The Breakup of the Family Relationship
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On April 10, 2015, without any prior discussion or warning, the Evanses
abruptly announced to the Nelsons that they were moving to Idaho. The Evanses
stated that they were selling the parties' jointly owned house, that the Nelsons
would lose their half of the house's equity, and that there was nothing the Nelsons could do about it. The Evanses disingenuously misstate the fact that they
decided to move to Idaho after they had "reached the end of their rope" due to
an impasse on the sale of the house, (Response Brief, p. 4), as the Evanses had
already decided to move to Idaho before announcing the sale of the house to the
Nelsons. (R. p. 72). The Nelsons were sad but did not oppose the move. The
Nelsons never tried to stop the Evanses from moving to Idaho. (Aug. R. pp. 581700).

The Nelsons made every effort to stay in touch with their grandchildren

during this process. (See Aug. R. pp. 128-35, 139-40, 143-44).
The Nelsons made several offers to purchase the Evanses' fifty percent
(50%) interest in the house. (Aug. R. pp. 640-49, shows that the Nelsons offered
to purchase the Evanses 50% interest in the house for the price of their outstanding mortgage note, and not the other way around). However, the Evanses
refused all offers and did not make any counteroffers. During a telephone conversation between Stephanie and Linda on May 11, 2015, Stephanie threatened
Linda by saying that the Nelsons would "never see their grandchildren again" if
they tried to stop the sale of the house. (R. p. 72). The Evanses have, in fact,
completed their threat not to allow any further communication between the Nelsons and their grandchildren after the May 11, 2019 phone call.
The Nelsons later learned, by accident, that the Evanses had already
listed the house with a realtor, entered into escrow for the sale of the house (in-
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eluding the sale of the Nelsons' 50% interest), and that they had accepted an offer by a third -party-all without the Nelsons' permission or knowledge. The Nelsons had no choice but to take action to intervene in the sale, as the Nelsons
wanted to protect their equity interests. The Nelsons reviewed the preliminary
closing statement for the third-party sale. The sales price of the house was
$828,800, but the Nelsons were not scheduled to receive any of the sale proceeds ($0.00), despite their unencumbered, half-interest in the house. This is
documented in the Chronology of Events. (Aug. R. pp. 581-700, 651).
To keep the peace, the Nelsons eventually purchased the Evanses' interest for the same amount, and on the same day, that the Evanses would have received from the third party buyer, so that the Evanses did not lose any money or
time due to the temporary dispute. Other than protecting their equity interests,
the Nelsons did not do anything to stop or delay the Evanses' move. (Id.).
In the years prior to the Evanses' move, the Nelsons gave approximately
$65,000.00 to their grandchildren for their college savings accounts. {Aug. R. pp.
543-51 ). Stephanie acknowledged her receipt of these funds in a text message
to Linda by saying: "Thank you does not even begin to convey our appreciation
for the ($) check-gift u gave to the girls today. Wow! It is very touching, very generous & very special to receive such a fantastic gift for their future." (Aug. R. p.
239). Sadly, the Evanses admitted in their depositions that they spent this money
on themselves rather than putting the money into a college savings account for
each grandchild. (Aug. R. pp. 95-96, 106-07). The Evanses attempt to deceive
the Nelsons in this matter is consistent with the Nelsons' narrative about the Evanses' attempt to misappropriate the Nelsons' equity in the house; it is also con-
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sistent with the conclusion that the Evanses are acting out of financial greed or
emotional spite, not out of any real concern for the best interests of their children.
To date, the Evanses have made good on their threat to estrange the Nelsons from their grandchildren. The Evanses have not allowed the Nelsons to see
or have any contact with their grandchildren, in any form whatsoever, since the
Evanses' May 11, 2015 threat and subsequent move to Idaho.
REPLY ARGUMENTS
1. Constitutionality is a Non-Issue on Appeal:

The Evanses state in their response brief that they have abandoned their
argument that Idaho Code§ 32-719 is unconstitutional (Response Brief, p. 6). As
such, the Supreme Court should not review the constitutionality of the statute on
appeal when neither of the parties have raised the issue on appeal:
Ordinarily the appellate court will not consider constitutional questions not
raised in the court below. Also, it has been said that the rule that an issue
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal applies with particular force to
constitutional issues or a claim that a statute is unconstitutional. Furthermore, in order to preserve the issue for appellate review, the constitutional
issue must not only have been presented to the trial court, but the trial
court must have ruled thereon.
Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822,841,203 P.3d 1221, 1240 (2009) (citing 4 C.J.S.

Appeal and Error § 300 (2008). On the Evanses' dismissal motion, the Magistrate Court did not expressly rule that Idaho Code§ 32-719 was unconstitutional.
In its findings, the Magistrate said simply: "In the instant case, the record is devoid of any material facts sufficient to overcome the fundamental constitutional
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presumption that fit parents make decisions in the best interests of their children.
Ther-e are ·no .factors ·that would justify the Nelsons' interference with the fundamental right the Evans' have to make decisions regarding the rearing of their
daughters." (R. p. 85). The Nelsons believe that this was not a constitutional ruling, but a procedural ruling, which does not create a basis for constitutional review on appeal.
See also State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 65, 90 P.3d 278, 290 (2003)
(abstract error does not necessarily rise to the level of constitutional dimension
unless and until a litigant properly presents a specific prejudice from such error);

In re Adoption of H.N.R., 2015-Ohio-5476, ,I 32, 145 Ohio St. 3d 144, 153, 47
N.E.3d 803, 812 (the constitutionality of a state statute may not be brought into
question by one who has not been injured by alleged unconstitutional provision).
In the event that the Supreme Court considers this issue on appeal, the
Court should find that Idaho Code§ 32-719 is constitutional. At a minimum, the
Court should find that the statute can be rendered fully constitutional. Idaho case
law is clear: "Where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, we review the
lower court's determination de novo. The party attacking a statute on constitutional grounds must overcome a strong presumption of validity. Appellate courts
are obligated to seek an interpretation of a statute that upholds its constitutionali-

!Y-"

Williams v. State (In re Driver's License Suspension of Williams), 153 Idaho

380,389,283 P.3d 127, 136 (Ct. App. 2012) (emphasis added).
In Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000), the United
States Supreme Court recognized "the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children." Id., p. 66. The
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Court further recognized: "If a fit parent's decision of the kind at issue here becomes subject to judicial review, the court must accord at least some special
weight to the parent's own determination." Id., p. 70. But the Court declined to
invalidate any state-specific grandparent visitation statutes, including Idaho Code
§ 32-719. Id., 73, fn. 1. See also Leavitt v. Leavitt, 142 Idaho 664, 132 P.3d 421
(2006) (adopting certain portions of the Troxel standards, including a clear and
convincing evidence standard and a "special weight" standard). Using the Troxel
and Leavitt standards, the Court can find that Idaho Code § 32-719 does not violate a parent's fundamental right to their children. The Court can apply the above
holdings and find that the statute is capable of constitutional application.
In 2015, the Idaho Legislature passed Idaho Code§§ 32-1010-13, to codify the Troxel holdings as to a parent's fundamental rights at the state legislative
level. (Respondents' Brief, p. 16). Thus, there is no need for the Court to invalidate § 32-719 on appeal. The Court can adopt and apply these new statutory
standards to all future§ 32-719 actions. Section§ 32-1010(6) makes it clear that
the passage of these new parenting statutes did not overturn existing presumptions that existing statutes, e.g., Idaho Code§ 32-719, are constitutional (or, at a
minimum, can be constitutionally applied). That section says: "Nothing in this act
shall be construed as altering the established presumption in favor of the constitutionality of statutes and regulations." Importantly, the Legislature adopted Idaho Code§§ 32-1010-13 many years after it had adopted Idaho Code§ 32-719.
In doing so, the Legislature did not overrule or modify Idaho Code § 32-719 in
any way. On appeal, the Court "must assume that the Legislature was aware of
all other statutes and legal precedence at the time the statute was passed." J &
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M Cattle Co., Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Farmers Nat'/ Bank, 156 Idaho 690, 695-96, 330

--P.3d 1048, 1053-54 (2014). Moreover, the Court should find that "the legislature
is presumed not to intend to overturn long established principles of law unless an
intention to do so plainly appears by express declaration or the language employed admits of no other reasonable construction." George W. Watkins Family
v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537,540, 797 P.2d 1385, 1388 (1990). Here, the Su-

preme Court must presume that the Legislature did not intend to limit Idaho
Code§ 32-719 because of the clear language in Section§ 32-1010(6). This judicial presumption is consistent with general Idaho case law: "In determining the
constitutionality of a legislative enactment, fundamental principles must ever be
kept in mind and rigidly observed. Statutes are presumed valid and all reasonable doubts as to constitutionality must be resolved in favor of validity." Eberle v.
Nielson, 78 Idaho 572, 577, 306 P.2d 1083, 1085 (1957) (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court recently confirmed: "When the court finds that a statute is capable of two interpretations, one which would make it constitutional and
the other unconstitutional, the court should adopt that construction which upholds the validity of the act." Regan v. Denney, 437 P.3d 15, 22 (2019) (internal
citations omitted). The Nelsons' proposed application of Idaho Code § 32-719 is
fully constitutional, while the Evanses' application seeks to render the statute unconstitutional, i.e., it seeks to discriminate against certain classes of parents depending on their marital status. The Supreme Court should adopt the Nelsons'
approach and render the statute constitutional. The Nelsons explained the basis
of their approach to the Magistrate Court on reconsidera tion-includin g the role
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of existing protections in Idaho Code § 32-719 actions. (Tr. p. 43, In. 18-25, p.
44, In. 1-25, p. 45, In. 1-21 ). The Magistrate erred by ignoring that approach.
In sum, the Supreme Court should find that Idaho Code§ 32-719 is constitutional, as written, or capable of being rendered constitutional.

2. Idaho Code§ 32-719 is Unambiguously Broad:
Idaho Code § 32-719 is unambiguously broad in its language-it applies
to all grandparents or great-grandparents, not just those who are part of broken
family units. The Supreme Court reached a similar statutory conclusion in the recent case D.A.F. v. Lieteau, No. 46026, 2019 Ida. LEXIS 183 (Oct. 7, 2019). In
Lieteau, the Court found that Idaho Code § 6-903(1) defines the scope for gov-

ernment liability in Idaho and that statute is "unambiguously broad" in terms of its
application. The Court adopted a "plain language" approach to the statute and
refused to put new limitations into the statute. Id., at *9. The Court noted the potential negative impact of its findings on minor sexual abuse victims. Id., at *15.
Nevertheless, the Court felt it was bound to "apply the plain language of [an] unambiguous statute," even in the face of such impacts. (Id.). The Court concluded
that any restrictions on the ITCA require legislative action, not judicial action:
"Had the legislature used express language to consider the application of the
ITCA to Section 6-1703, the case would not be before us today." Id., at *20. 2

2 The Nelsons
recognize that the Court in Lieteau read the statute at-issue to constrict (not expand} the parties' petition rights. But that does not make the case unusable in this appeal. Adopting Lieteau as containing universal principles, the Court is probably going to reach different conclusions for different statutes, depending on the text of the statute and its proposed application. It
is the interpretive principles, not the interpretive outcome, that matters. The Supreme Court in this
appeal can apply the Lieteau principles to Idaho Code § 32-719 and find that the statute in unambiguously broad in its language, i.e., it allows all grandparents and great-grandparents to petition
for visitation, without any express or implied filing restrictions.
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Likewise, the Supreme Court should find that Idaho Code § 32-719 is un-

--- - - ambiguously broad under Lieteau, i.e., that the statute does not contain any filing
restrictions, and that all grandparents or great-grandparents can petition for reasonable visitation under the statute-not just those with divorcing children. The
Court should find that the "plain language" of the statute requires a broad construction of the statute. (Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 21, 24). The Court should
reject the Evanses request to narrow the statute on the grounds of public policy
(Respondents' Brief, pp. 28-31 ), as the Legislature has consistently failed to do

so in its recent session. (Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 23-24).
The Evanses agreed at one point, in their trial-level arguments, that the
court "has a duty ... to give Idaho Code Section 32-719 its plain meaning." (Tr. p.
57, In. 15-6). However, the Evanses are wrong in assuming that the "plain meaning" of the statute involves anything more than the meaning of its words:
[Statutory interpretation] must begin with the literal words of the statute,
those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and
the statute must be construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous,
this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written. Unless the result is palpably absurd, we must assume that the legislature
means what is clearly stated in the statute.
State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003) (internal cita-

tions omitted). (See also Respondents' Brief, p. 8). The Supreme Court should
find that the plain meaning of Idaho Code § 32-719 is manifest in its words. The
Court should find that, based upon the statute's plain and ordinary words, the
Nelsons are entitled to petition for reasonable visitation rights and should be allowed such visitation rights if, after hearing and after applying the Troxel and
Leavitt standards, the Magistrate finds that the visitation is in the best interests of
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their grandchildren. The Supreme Court should find that the Magistrate Court
-erred in dismissing the Nelsons' petition prior to the time of a hearing, i.e., based
solely on the statute's code location and the Evanses' marital status.
3. Idaho Code § 32-719 Applies to Intact Family Units:
The Evanses are not exempt from Idaho Code § 32-719 due to their marital status. As explained in this argument section, the Evanses do not enjoy any
more parental protections under Troxel than do single parents or unmarried couples. The Supreme Court must apply Troxel standards and fundamental parenting rights equally to all Idaho parents, regardless of their marital status. "The
equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions embrace the principle that all persons in like circumstances should receive the same benefits and
burdens of the law." State v. Breed, 111 Idaho 497, 500, 725 P.2d 202, 205 (Ct.
App. 1986). Moreover, "the due process and equal protection provisions of these
Constitutions are not intended to interfere with the power of the State in the exercise of the police powers to prescribe regulations for the protection and promotion of the welfare of the people." Rowe v. Pocatello, 70 Idaho 343, 350, 218
P.2d 695, 699 (1950). The Court should not adopt the Evanses' argument that
"intact" families enjoy more parental rights, and the Court should not override the
State's compelling interests in protecting the best interests of minor children.
The Evanses create their own definition of an intact family to mean "a
married, cohabitating couple where both individuals are biological parents of a
child or children, where the child or children live full time with those biological
parents, and there is no valid custody action affecting the children." (Respond-

ents' Brief, p. 6, fn. 1). There are several problems with this artificial definition.
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First, the Evanses do not support the definition with any legal authority. Next, the
Evanses discriminate against, and exclude, whole groups of parents because of
their definition, e.g., blended family parents, foster parents, adoptive parents,
and, of course, parents who have separated or divorced and have now formed
new, stable relationships. The Evanses' self-serving definition excludes these
other groups of parents from the Evanses' proposed application of Idaho Code §
32-719. The Evanses fail to show that their concept of an "intact family" enjoys
any additional protections beyond the heightened standards provided for in
Troxel and Leavitt. The Evanses fail to show that Idaho Code §§ 32-1010, et
seq., makes such parenting distinctions. The Supreme Court should find that the
Troxel and Leavitt standards apply equally to all Idaho parents and that it violates

equal protection to give heightened protections to parents of "intact families."
The Evanses cite to several non-Idaho grandparent visitation cases and
conclude that "a common thread among these out-of-state cases and statutes is
that most courts are only allowing grandparent visitation where the family has
been severed so as to justify the state's intrusion into the family's life." (Respondents' Brief, p. 23). The problem with the Evanses' analysis is that it com-

pares dissimilar sets of laws and issues. The Evanses are citing to legal examples from states which have limited grandparent visitation as a matter of legislative policy. For instance, the Evanses cite to Louisiana law, Missouri law, and
North Carolina law as examples of states which do not allow grandparent visitation due to intact family units. (Id., pp. 25-26). But these state statutes all expressly limit grandparent visitation on the face of their statutes. Unwittingly, the
Evanses prove this distinction by citing to Oklahoma's visitation statute, which

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF I PAGE 19

says: "Under no circumstances shall any judge grant the right of visitation to any
grandparent if the child is a member of an intact nuclear family and both parents
of the child object to the granting of visitation." (Id., p. 27). This language only
underscores the Nelsons' point-that limiting grandparent visitation to specific
scenarios, e.g., divorce, is a legislative prerogative and not a judicial prerogative.
The Evanses do not highlight any cases in which the Courts refuse to give
grandparent visitation in an intact family without a prior legislative basis.
The Evanses cite to Michels v. Lyons (In re A.AL.), 2019 WI 57, 387
Wis. 2d 1, 927 N.W.2d 486, which says: "Prior to granting a petition for grandparent visitation, a majority of state statutes require a triggering event dissolving
the family unit, such as the death or abandonment of a parent, divorce, or the
child residing with a third party prior to granting a petition for grandparent visitation." Id., p. 496 (emphasis added). (Respondents' Brief, p. 23). Again, this citation underscores the Nelsons' argument that it is the legislature's job, not the
court's job, to define triggering events for visitation. As the Lyons Court explains:
"Section 247.24(1 )(c) permitted the circuit court to grant grandparent visitation
only upon the rendering of a judgment of annulment, divorce or legal separation.
Id. Even after this limiting language was eliminated with the codification of Wis.

Stat. § 767.245(4) (1977-78), the legislative history demonstrates an intent by
the legislature to address visitation issues prom pted by the divorce or legal separation of a married couple." Id., p. 496 (emphasis added). Thus, the Lyons Court
centers its whole decision on the notion of a "statutory precursor." Id., p. 497.
The Evanses fail to show how the Lyons analysis is relevant to the Magistrate
Court's decision to change Idaho's policy as a matter pure judicial policymaking.
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The Evanses do not seem to acknowledge that the states which lack express statutory filing restrictions, e.g., Kentucky, Oregon, South Dakota, New
York, and Wyoming, have found ways to apply their statutes broadly without violating the mandates of Troxel. (Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 31-39). These
states have apparently done so without citing to statutory location as their rationale. (Id.). There is no evidence that a state's decision to keep these otherwise
broad grandparent visitation statutes outside their divorce codes has made any
difference in the courts' analyses or holdings on grandparent visitation.
William Jennings Bryan once said, "An apt illustration is a powerful argument; but nothing is more misleading than an illustration that does not illustrate."
(See World Peace: A Written Debate Between William Howard Taft and William
Jennings Bryan, New York: Geroge H. Doran Company (1917), p. 87). In that

sense, the Evanses are attempting to use illustrations which do not illustrate. The
Supreme Court should find that the Evanses have failed to show that a majority
of American courts-or even a minority of the courts-have determined the
scope of grandparent visitation rights as a matter of pure judicial discretion.
For additional discussion of interpretive standards, see City of Huetter v.
Keene, 150 Idaho 13, 15, 244 P.3d 157, 159 (2010) ("We cannot add by judicial

interpretation words that are not found in the statute as written."); See also
Barnes v. Hinton, 103 Idaho 619, 620, 651 P.2d 553, 554 (Ct. App. 1982) ("We

cannot insert into statutes terms or provisions which are obviously not there.").
The Supreme Court should follow these holdings and should refuse the Evanses'
invitation to insert new filing restrictions into Idaho Code§ 32-719.
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See also State v. Bodenbach, 448 P.3d 1005, 1014 (2019) ('This Court
often turns to dictionary definitions to ascertain the ordinary meaning of an undefined term in a statute. The statute need not be ambiguous to resort to dictionaries to determine the ordinary meaning of a term."). The Supreme Court should
find that the words of Idaho Code§ 32-719 do not contain, or convey, the kind of
grandparent filing restrictions proposed by the Evanses on appeal.
The Nelsons recognize that the Magistrate expressed concern about unfounded petitions for visitation. (R. p. 79). However, the Magistrate has a duty to
deal with that issue on a case-by-case basis, as part of a best interests hearing
and not as part of a dismissal. The Magistrate should not have refused to enforce the statute based on its own policy views and predictions. The Supreme
Court should find that the Magistrate Court is required to enforce Idaho Code §
32-719 as written, regardless of the Magistrate's policy views. The Supreme
Court should find that the Magistrate and other trial-level courts are capable of
weeding out any unfounded petitions during the trial phase of visitation actions.
In sum, the Evanses have failed to show any connection between grandparent visitation statutes and intact family units. At most, the Evanses have underscored the Nelsons' argument on appeal, viz., that the state legislature (not
the courts) must be the body to impose any filing restrictions.

4. Idaho Code § 32-719 is Defined by Its Text. Not Its Location:
The Evanses' leading argument on appeal is that Idaho Code § 32-719 is
defined by its location, i.e., that because the statute is located in the divorce
code, it can only be applied in divorce actions. (Respondents' Brief, pp. 9-31 ).
The Nelsons have already addressed the problems with this argument in their
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opening brief. (Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 25-28). To summarize-the Nelsons have shown that Chapter 7 is not the exclusive location for divorce provisions (or even non-intact family provisions), as Chapter 9 involves several divorce provisions, such as property and debt provisions; that statutory long titles
are more important than statutory location in determining ambiguous legislative
intent; that courts should not insert words into a statute which the legislature left
out; that the headings of statutes are not part of the statutes, and that the courts
must look at the contents of a statute to determine if its application is broader
than its title. (Id.). The Supreme Court should find on appeal that the location of
Idaho Code§ 32-719 does not override its unambiguously broad text.
The fact that most states have kept their grandparent visitation statute
outside of their divorce chapters seems to be a mere coincidence or happenstance. The Evanses fail to show otherwise. The cases cited by both parties focus on the issue of grandparent visitation in the context of legislative language,
not statutory location. The Nelsons are unable to find any cases which directly
support the Evanses' position, i.e., that a court should deny grandparent visitation, despite the breadth of the visitation statute, because of statutory location.
The Evanses argue that the laws from states such as Kentucky, Maryland,
Oregon, New York, and Wyoming do not support the Nelsons' position because
their grandparent visitation statutes are located outside of their divorce chapters.
(Respondents' Brief, pp. 20-23). However, the Evanses fail to cite any cases

from states where the courts have allowed (or limited) grandparent visitation due
to statutory location. The Evanses seem to underscore the importance of legislative policymaking when they say: "Oregon's statutory scheme is quite different
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from that of Idaho." (Id., p. 22). The Evanses then fail to show that Oregon allows
for independent actions because of statutory location (as opposed to lack of restrictions or triggering events in the text). The Supreme Court should find that the
Evanses have failed to show the relevance of location over language, and that
location is not controlling over the language in terms of statutory scope.
The Evanses rely on New Phase lnvs., Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Jarvis, 153 Idaho
207, 280 P.3d 710 (2012) to argue that code location can be used to determine
legislative intent. (Respondents' Brief, pp. 10-11 ). That is not an actual holding of
the case. In Jarvis, the Court determined that Idaho Code § 32-912 only offers
community property protections to a husband and wife, not to community creditors. The Court took a plain meaning approach to the statute, saying: "That provision only mentions the rights of the husband and wife in dealing with community property, saying nothing about any rights of third parties." (Id., p. 210). Admittedly, the Court did say, in passing, that "a reading of the provision in the context
of the entire chapter is similarly enlightening." (Id.). But that Evanses make too
much of the Court's observation on location, as the Court went on to examine
the text of the statute as compared to the text of other neighboring sections, e.g.,
Section § 32-916, and found that these sections also contained express limitations as to "husband and wife." (Id.). The Court did not conclude, as the Evanses
are trying to conclude, that the chapter title was dispositive. At all times, the
Court focused on the language used in the different statute sections. The Court
noted the impact of plain language and statutory omissions in its holdings:
While Section 32-912 clearly expresses an intent to govern the property
rights of the marital community members, it is silent regarding any rights
of third parties. Indeed, our repeated announcement in Finlayson, Tew,
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and Brown-that the statute was designed for the protection of the community-follows directly from that plain language reading, and we do not
see how allowing a creditor to use the statute to attack another creditor's
encumbrance furthers that stated purpose.
(Id.) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court should find that Jarvis supports the
Nelsons' position, not the Evanses' position. The Court should find that the plain
language of Idaho Code§ 32-719 does not limit grandparent visitation to divorce
actions, and that the Evanses' position is not supported by the text of any of the
neighboring sections in Title 32, Chapter 7, "Divorce Actions."
The Evanses attempt to distinguish the Doe v. Doe case, saying, "while it
is true that this section is one of the keys to the courthouse, grandparents do not
come into possession of those keys just because they are grandparents." (Respondents' Brief, p. 18). The Evanses continue, "each section outlined in Doe
has requirements that must be met before the keys are available." (Id.). The
problem with this argument is that the Evanses do explain what other requirements, if any, are necessary for the Nelsons to use Section§ 32-719 as a key to
the Idaho courthouses. The Nelsons are grandparents, and the Nelsons believe
that at least some continued visitation is in their grandchildren's best interests.
Idaho Code § 32-719 opens the door for the Nelsons to present their evidence at
a hearing, and the Magistrate Court erred in denying them a hearing.
The Evanses point out that only 8 states have grandparent visitation statutes that appear in their divorce chapters. (Respondents' Brief, p. 27). But that
fact is unimportant because the Evanses fail to show that these states have expressly limit grandparent visitation by reason of statutory location. For instance,
the Evanses cite to South Dakota as having their visitation statute in their divorce
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chapter. (Id., p. 21 ). However, the Evanses fail to cite to any South Dakota case
law which finds that statutory location is important in statutory interpretation. At
most, the Evanses point to a lack of statutory application to intact family units: "It
does not appear that there is an instance of a South Dakota court awarding visitation over the objections of two parents in an intact family." (Id.). The Nelsons
agree with the Evanses that visitation in non-divorce situations may be a rare
fact pattern, and an issue of first impression in Idaho. But the absence of such
appellate cases does not establish the Evanses' position, i.e., that the courts in
these states have categorically denied visitation in intact families due to statutory
location. It is the Evanses, not the Nelsons, who are advancing a novel statutory
interpretation. The location of Idaho Code§ 32-719 should not alter its meaning.
The Evanses' claim that the Nelsons position, if adopted, would "render
Idaho the only state with appellate case law allowing for an independent cause of
action for grandparent visitation where (1) the family is intact, (2), the visitation
statute is located within the state's divorce code, and (3) the visitation statute
says nothing of an original cause of action with regard to an intact family." (Respondents Brief, p. 27). That is another series of artificial distinctions. The Ev-

anses have failed to show the significance of their intact family and location arguments, and so the Supreme Court does not need to worry about contravening
the arguments. The Supreme Court should fully reject the arguments.
Importantly, the state Legislature amended Idaho Code § 32-717 in 1995,
the year after it had passed Idaho Code§ 32-719, adding a new subsection (3)
to the statute. The 1995 amendment allows grandparents to intervene in divorce
and custody actions and to seek custody rights in those actions. That section
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begins with the important legal phrase: "In an action for divorce ... ". (Id.). The
Legislature could have added a similar restrictive language to Idaho Code § 32719 actions, but it did not. The Legislature could have also migrated the terms of
§ 32-1008 to § 32-717, but it did not. The Evanses cannot ask the Court to add
those restrictions now by judicial decree. In Leavitt, cited above, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that Idaho Code § 32-719 was broad enough to allow
grandparents to intervene in pending divorce cases. However, the Court did not
limit section§ 32-719 to intervention actions only. The Court held that section§
32-719 actions do not even share the same best interest factors as normal divorce and custody actions, suggesting the ability of grandparent litigants to petition outside of divorce actions using a set of distinct non-divorce factors.
Even if the Supreme Court finds that the location of Idaho Code § 32-719
is relevant to the statute's meaning, the Court must not make the location determinative, especially when the Idaho State Legislature has repeatedly failed to do
so. (Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 23-24). Idaho grandparent visitation was not
originally a part of the divorce chapter and, as such, was not meant to be exclusively applied within the confines of divorces. (Id.). The Court should find that §
32-719 constitutes an independent visitation action, regardless of family status.
In sum, the Supreme Court should not determine the intent of Idaho Code
§ 32-719 based solely on its location. Notwithstanding its location, the Court
must still adopt a reasonable statutory interpretation. See Gonzalez v. Thacker,
148 Idaho 879, 881, 231 P.3d 524, 526 (2009). Here, the most reasonable interpretation of Idaho Code § 32-719 is that its current location allows for-but does
not limit-the statute's application in divorce actions. As seen in Leavitt, the stat-
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ute already allows grandparents to intervene in divorce actions. But as shown in
the Nelsons' opening brief, the Court has not confined the statute to that role.
The statute is broad enough to allow for all types of grandparent visitation actions.
5. Miscellaneous Reply Arguments:

The Evanses suggest that both parties believe that Idaho Code § 32-719
is ambiguous. That is not true. The Nelsons have argued that the "plain language" of the statute allows for an independent visitation action and that statutory construction rules should only apply in the "alternative" case of ambiguity.

(Appellants' Brief, pp. 20-21 ). The Evanses admit in their brief that "the statute's

words themselves are fairly clear." (Respondents' Brief, p. 8). Of course, the Evanses then state that the "circumstances in which the statute applies" is ambiguous. (Id.). But that point is immaterial because of the Evanses' first point, i.e., the
clarity of the words. The Evanses fail to point to any language in Section § 32719 to show that the statute does not apply to all family circumstances. That
would be an unreasonable limitation given the clarity of the wording of the statute.
The Evanses suggest that the "literal words of § 32-719 offer little guidance" to the statute's meaning. (Respondents' Brief, p. 9). That is only true in
terms of the Evanses' interpretations. The statute does not give any support the
Evanses' proposed interpretations, i.e., it does not indicate any circumstantial
family limitations. The Supreme Court should reject the Evanses' interpretations
because their position cannot be supported by the words of the statute.
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The Evanses suggest that the Legislature did not arbitrarily place Section
§ 32-719 into the divorce chapter. (Respondents' Brief, p. 11 ). That is a conclusory statement, as the Evanses do not show otherwise, e.g., that the Legislature
put the statute in that chapter in order to limit its application. The Evanses fail to
point to any statutory or interpretive history to that effect. The Supreme Court
should reject the Evanses' argument on legislative intent as mere speculation.
The Evanses cite to Carey v. Population Servs. Int'/, 431 U.S. 678, 97 S.
Ct. 2010 (1977) as "recognizing that the state may not invade the family life absent an adequate state justification." (Respondents' Brief, p. 29). That is not true.
The Carey decision focuses on "the decisions that an individual may make without unjustified government interference." Id., p. 685. In other words, the decision
focuses on individual rights as opposed to conglomerate "family'' rights. The decision certainly does not support the Evanses novel suggestion that parents who
are married enjoy even greater protections than parents who are divorced.
The Evanses object to the Nelsons' use of legislative history, saying that
the statement of purpose for Section§ 32-719, i.e., to "expand the court's discretion," could mean anything. (Respondents' Brief, p. 15). However, the possibility
that a legislative statement could mean anything does not discount the fact that it
has an objectively reasonable meaning. The Nelsons believe that the statement
at-issue has only one reasonable meaning, i.e., that the statute applies broadly
to all grandparent visitation actions. This meaning is further supported by the
Legislature's choice of SB 1438 over SB 1470. (Appellants' Opening Brief, p.
23).
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The Evanses suggest that the Legislature "knew what it was doing" when
it placed§ 32-719 into the divorce chapter. (Respondents' Brief, p. 16). But that
is another conclusory statement. The Evanses fail to show that the Legislature
intended to limit the scope of the statute to "non-intact families" by moving it to a
new chapter in the code. The Nelsons have not been able to find any legislative
discussion on the matter, except what they cited in their opening brief. (Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 22-24 ). The Evanses are committing the same fault of

which they accuse the Nelsons, i.e., they are speculating on legislative intent.
The Supreme Court should not do so on appeal. The Court should find that the
Legislature intended to "expand the court's discretion" in visitation actions.
The Evanses suggest that the Nelsons are trying to read provisions into
Idaho Code § 32-719, to allow "for the disruption of an intact family unit where
the visitation statute resides within the larger divorce section." (Respondents'
Brief, p. 17). Just the opposite is true-the Nelsons are trying to enforce the Leg-

islature's express intent in passing the statute, i.e., to expand the court's discretion in allowing for grandparent visitation. By contrast, the Evanses are trying to
insert new filing restrictions against intact families which do not exist in the statute (or the statutory history). For that matter, the Evanses are trying to get new
parental rights protections, i.e., married couple protections, which do not exist in
Idaho Code §§ 32-1010-13. The Supreme Court should engage in a plain reading of the statute and should not insert any new terms into the statute.
The Evanses say that Idaho Code § 32-1013 protects against "the state's
intrusion into the family's private life." (Respondents' Brief, p. 27). As stated
above, Section § 32-1013 deals with parental rights, not intact family rights. The
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Evanses do not have a basis to say that a visitation actions against divorcing
parents are permitted under that statute, whereas actions against married parents is not. Sections §§ 32-1010-13 do not make such distinctions. The Supreme
Court should reject the Evanses' novel interpretations on appeal.
The Evanses state that "there is no authority that a court's exercise of
reason must be based on statistical or empirical evidence. Commonsense observations are adequate, even if speculative" (Respondents' Brief, p. 32). That
argument overlooks the fact that the Nelsons were challenging a Magistrate
Court ruling which was inherently statistical in nature, i.e., the "proverbial floodgates" of runaway grandparent visitation. (Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 44-45).
Under an abuse of discretion standard, the Magistrate has at least some duty to
ensure that its findings are based on substantial and competent evidence in the
record. "An abuse of discretion is found when the magistrate court's findings are
clearly erroneous such that the court's findings are not based on substantial and
competent evidence." Clair v. Clair, 153 Idaho 278, 282, 281 P.3d 115, 119
(2012). Even under the Evanses' proposed standards, the Magistrate failed to
show that his social policy observations stemmed from the evidence in the record.
Importantly, the Evanses submit copies of the statements of Georgia
Mackley of Grandparents as Parents, who tells the legislature: "In Idaho, 25,000
children are being raised by grandparents." (Respondents' brief, "Exhibit A, p. 3).
And while Ms. Mackley was speaking about visitation in the context of divorce
cases, she highlights the need for the Supreme Court to adopt an interpretation
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of Idaho Code § 32-719 which meets the Legislatures' purpose of "expand[ing]
the court's discretion" in visitation cases. (Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 23).
The Evanses state that Idaho Code § 32-719 is the "most questionable of
its kind in all the country." (Respondent's' Brief, p. 19). That is not true. The Nelsons have shown that Kentucky, for instance, has a sparsely worded visitation
statute, and yet the Kentucky appellate courts have successfully applied the
statutes in non-divorce situations. (Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 31-33). The
Supreme Court can find that Idaho Code § 32-719 is not questionable, even if it
is different. As in the Ueteau case, the Court should find that the statute is unambiguously broad and should refuse to construe the statute otherwise.
The Evanses cited extensively to Idaho Code §§ 32-1010-13, suggesting
that the new parental statutes somehow control the meaning of Section § 32719. The Evanses fail to consider that these statutes are not incompatible with
each other. Idaho case law says: "Where two statutes, governing the same subject, can be reconciled and construed so as to give effect to both, no repeal occurs, and it is the duty of the courts to so construe them." State v. Roderick, 85
Idaho 80, 84, 375 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1962). The Supreme Court should find that
Idaho Code § 32-719 is not facially incompatible with Idaho's parental rights
statutes. The Supreme Court should give full effect to both statutes on appeal.
The Evanses suggest that Hawaii state law on "substantial harm" is relevant to interpreting statutes outside of the state's divorce chapter. (Respondents'
Brief, p. 24 ). Even if true, the Evanses fail to show how the principle is relevant to

Idaho Code § 32-719, which is located inside the divorce chapter. Moreover, the
Evanses fail to recognize that the case law on "substantial harm" is an outlier
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and that a petition under the Troxel standards is not constitutionally required to
show "harm" to a child before asking the Court for reasonable visitation. Indeed,
the Troxel Court expressly declined to make that ruling. See Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57, 73, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2064 (2000). Justice Stevens explained in his
Troxel dissent that "we have never held that the parent's liberty interest in this

relationship is so inflexible as to establish a rigid constitutional shield, protecting
every arbitrary parental decision from any challenge absent a threshold finding of
harm." Id., 86. Also, Justice Scalia commented in his dissent:
Presumptions notwithstanding, we should recognize that there may be circumstances in which a child has a stronger interest at stake than mere
protection from serious harm caused by the termination of visitation by a
"person" other than a parent. The almost infinite variety of family relationships that pervade our ever-changing society strongly counsel against the
creation by this Court of a constitutional rule that treats a biological
parent's liberty interest in the care and supervision of her child as an isolated right that may be exercised arbitrarily. It is indisputably the business
of the States, rather than a federal court employing a national standard , to
assess in the first instance the relative importance of the conflicting interests that give rise to disputes such as this.
Id., 90 (emphasis added). The Kentucky Supreme Court has reached similar

conclusions: "If the grandparent demonstrates that harm to the child will result
from a deprivation of visitation with the grandparent, this is very strong evidence
that visitation is in the child's best interest. But showing harm to the child is not
the only way that a grandparent can rebut the presumption in favor of the child's
parents." Walker v. Blair, 382 S.W .3d 862, 872 (Ky. 2012). The Supreme Court
should adopt the more balanced Troxel and Walker standards, not the Hawaii
court's "harm" standards. There is no evidence that the Idaho Legislature, or this
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Court, has ever adopted or applied such rigid grandparent visitation standards.
To do so in the Nelsons case, or any other Idaho case, is unwarranted.
The Evanses mention, in passing, that some states have adopted an "extraordinary circumstances" visitation standard. (Respondents' Brief, pp. 20-1 ).
Even if that were the case in Idaho (which it is not), the South Dakota Supreme
Court in the case Feist v. Lemieux-Feist, 2010 S.D. 104, 793 N.W.2d 57 makes it
clear that the standard only applies to the court's decision on whether to give a
natural's parent's decision "special weight" under Troxel. The South Dakota court
explains: "We interpreted the language of Troxel to mean that deference and
special weight must be given only when a fit parent has adequately cared for his
or her children, i.e., when no extraordinary circumstances apply. When extraordinary circumstances have been shown, the presumption disappears." Id., 62.
Importantly, the Troxel Court notes that its decision did not involve the kind of
scenario which the Nelsons now face, i.e., "there [was] no allegation that Granville ever sought to cut off visitation entirely." Troxel, 71. Thus, the sudden (and
vindictive) termination of the Nelsons' visitation with their grandchildren is extraordinary when compared with the scenario in Troxel and other such cases. In
any event, the issue of "extraordinary circumstances," if applied to the Nelsons'
case, is only relevant in terms of the Evanses' burden of proof at hearing. The
Nelsons are prepared to give the Evanses their full presumption of "special
weight," making the "extraordinary circumstances" standard irrelevant. The Supreme Court should not apply the standard to affect the Nelsons' statutory right
to a hearing.
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The Magistrate Court in this case has, in essence, afforded the Evanses
an irrebuttable presumption in favor of their decision, notwithstanding the language in Troxel. (R. p. 85}. The Magistrate has ignored the fact that the "special
weight" mentioned in Troxel has to do with the Evanses' burdens of proof at
hearing, but that it does not excuse the Evanses from having to participate in a
hearing. The Magistrate erred in putting too much emphasis on the Evanses' parental fitness to the detriment of the Nelsons' statutory right to a hearing.
As noted in the Nelsons' opening brief, the Evanses do not enjoy an absolute right in this area, to the complete exclusion of the state. (Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 42}. The Supreme Court must balance the Evanses' rights against

the State's compelling interests. The only way to do that is to uniformly apply
Idaho Code§ 32-719 to all grandparent visitation contexts, regardless of marital
status, subject to established constitutional standards that protect parental rights.
The Evanses suggest that the Supreme Court should uphold the Magistrate Court's summary judgment ruling because "the Magistrate Court's findings
of fact were based on relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to
support a conclusion." (Responden ts' Brief, pp. 33-34}. That is not true. As noted
in the Nelsons' opening brief, the summary judgment evidence was entirely in
the Nelsons' favor, the Evanses having failed to submit any counterevidence.
(Appellants' Brief, pp. 45-46}. The Magistrate Court should have found that Idaho

Code§ 32-719 allows for independent visitation actions and that there was a material dispute over the best interests of the grandchildren. At a minimum, the
Magistrate should have allowed the Nelsons' petition to proceed to a hearing and
should not have dismissed it for lack of supporting material facts. (Id.}.
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The Nelsons have devoted substantial time to the issues of ambiguity and
legislative history in their opening brief. (Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 22-39).
The Nelsons repeat and summarize those arguments herein by reference, i.e.,
the Legislative history for Idaho Code § 32-719 supports the Nelsons' position,
the long title for the statute and its neighbor, § 32-717, supports the Nelsons' position, and the persuasive case law from other states shows that§ 32-717 can be
applied in a constitution manner under Troxel. The Nelsons repeat herein their
various assignments of error by reference and ask the Supreme Court to find
that the Magistrate Court abused its discretion in dismissing the Nelsons' case.
As Justice Stevens wisely concluded in his Troxel dissent: "The presumption that parental decisions generally serve the best interests of their children is
sound, and clearly in the normal case the parent's interest is paramount. But
even a fit parent is capable of treating a child like a mere possession." Troxel, p.
86. Here, the record shows that the Evanses have treated their children as mere
possessions-purposefully and spitefully withholding the Nelsons' visitation due
to a temporary financial dispute. The Nelsons were entitled under the circumstances to petition for visitation and to receive a hearing opportunity to show, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the Evanses did not make their visitation decisions in the grandchildren's best interests. Idaho Code § 32-719 is broad
enough to support the Nelsons' non-divorce petition while at the same time giving constitutional deference and protections to the Evanses' parental rights.
The Nelsons have presented substantial evidence in support of their petition. The Magistrate Court should have construed that evidence in the Nelsons'
favor and found that the Nelsons had a right to an evidentiary hearing on visita-
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tion. The Supreme Court should find on appeal that the Magistrate Court abused
its discretion. The record was not "devoid" of facts in favor of the Nelsons' petition. (See R. p. 85). Just the opposite. When construed in a light most favorable
to the Nelsons (Id., 1), the record shows that the Nelsons' continued visitation
with their grandchildren is in the grandchildren's best interests.
In the end, the Supreme Court need not resolve the parties' ongoing "best
interest" dispute on appeal. The Court need not make any radical legislative decisions on appeal. The Court need only make the ordinary and predictable decision to construe Idaho§ 32-719 according to its plain language. The Court did so
in Lieteau; it can do so here. The Court should reverse the Magistrate's dismissal
order (and District Court's affirmation of that order) and allow the Nelsons' petition to continue to a statutory best interest hearing under Section§ 32-719.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court should reverse and remand the Magistrate Court's
dismissal order. The Magistrate did not follow appropriate legislative interpretation standards, and the Evanses failed to rebut the Nelsons' assignments of error. This is not a constitutional case, nor is it a landmark policy case. Idaho Code
§ 32-719 is already broad enough to support the Nelsons' petition. The Court only needs to interpret the statute according to its plain terms. As needed, the
Court can instruct the Magistrate to constitutionally apply the statute on remand,
thus complying with established Troxel and Leavitt standards.
Dated November 15, 2019
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